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Owings: Owings: Output Contracts and the Unreasonably Disproportionate

Output Contracts and the Unreasonably
Disproportionate Clause of § 2-306*
Atlantic Track and Turnout v. Perini'
I. INTRODUCTION

Open quantity contracts evolved due to the commercial advantages
inherent in such contracts. However, the level of permissible quantity
variation within an open quantity contract has been frequently litigated. In
Atlantic Track and Turnout v. Perini,2 the First Circuit resolved a dispute
concerning variation within such a contract. This Note examines the
traditional analysis used by the court in resolving this dispute and suggests an
alternative method of analysis.
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Atlantic Track and Turnout ("Atlantic") brought a breach of contract
action against Perini Corporation under the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC"), alleging Perini's failure to perform under a contract for the purchase
and sale of railroad materials
The Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority ("MBTA") had awarded Perini the contract to rehabilitate a thirteen
mile section of railroad track in October of 1987.
As part of the
rehabilitation, Perini was to undercut the track and replace the stone
foundation.'
In early June, Perini entered into a contract to sell salvage from the
project to Atlantic.6 Between June 28 and June 30, Atlantic issued purchase
orders "for all available materials." 7 Each order estimated the amount of
salvage that would be available.' Perini did not contest the reasonableness of
these estimates at the time they were issued.
* The author wishes to thank Professor William Henning for his time, assistance,
and invaluable insight throughout the writing of this Note.
1. 989 F.2d 541 (1st Cir. 1993).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 542.
4. Id.
5. Id.

6. Id. The case implies Perini contracted with Atlantic in June 1988, as Atlantic
began issuing purchase orders for salvage materials in June 1988. Id.
7. Id.

8. Id. at 543.
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The MBTA suspended undercutting on August 8, 1988 due to a funding
shortage, and eventually Perini and the MBTA terminated the contract.9 By
October 26, Perini had no physical presence on the job site."0 Atlantic knew
by August 22, 1988 that all undercutting had been suspended and asked Perini
when additional material would be available." Perini informed Atlantic that
the MBTA might terminate the project and that Perini had shipped "all
available" salvage as required in the purchase orders, even though Perini had
shipped only 15% of the materials previously estimated." Atlantic sued
Perini, claiming "that the amount of materials shipped was well below the
stated estimates."13
Following cross motions for summary judgment, the trial proceeded on
two issues: "(1) whether the contract was ambiguous; and (2) whether trade
usage would supplement the contract terms to enable Atlantic to maintain its
action."' 4 After Atlantic's presentation of evidence, the court entered
judgment in favor of Perini based on its partial findings. 5
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether Perini's
tender of only 15% of the quantity estimated was "unreasonably
disproportionate" as defined by UCC section 2-306, which governs output
contracts.16 The First Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of
Perini, holding that an output contract allocates "the risk of a change in the
seller's business that makes continuation costly" to the buyer, while the "seller
assumes the risk of a less urgent change in circumstances.""
IIl. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Open quantity contracts allow one of the contracting parties to determine
the quantity that will be taken or delivered under the contract.'" The term
open quantity contracts includes both requirements contracts and output

9.Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 543 and n.2.
13. Id.at 543.

at 542.
14. Id.
15. Id. The court entered judgment pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 52(c) in favor of
Perini. Id.
at 544. The First Circuit also considered the issue of contract ambiguity
16. Id.
and trade usage as discussed by the trial court.
17. Id. at 545.
18. Stacy A. Silkworth, Quantity Variation in Open Quantity Contracts, 51 U.
Prrr. L. REv.235, 238 (1990).
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contracts." Under a requirements contract, a seller has an obligation "to
supply the designated commodity to the buyer to the extent of the latter's
needs during a specified period of time."2' In contrast, an output contract
involves an agreement "to sell all the goods or services a party may produce
or perform to another party.

. .""

Thus, the agreement between Perini and

Atlantic was an output contract. 22
Output contracts evolved due to the commercial advantages inherent in
quantity contracts. Output contracts provide elements of security, efficiency
and flexibility not found in fixed quantity contracts.' There is security
because the seller is confident of a constant demand for her product, while the
buyer is assured of a supply.24
Since the seller is assured of constant demand, the seller can maintain a
steady production level, thus increasing efficiency.' This steady production
level leads to stability in supply needs, allowing the producer to bargain for
lower supply prices.
2
Output contracts promote efficiency in various other waysY.
First,
parties do not have to continually renegotiate contracts; an output contract
allows both the seller and buyer to contract for an extended period.28
Therefore, the cost of locating new buyers is eliminated for the term of the
contract. 29 Furthermore, the output seller can stabilize the rate of production,
leading to efficient use of labor and capital.3"

19. Id.
20. R.A. Weaver and Assocs., Inc. v. Asphalt Constr., Inc., 587 F.2d 1315, 1319
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
21. Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc., 335 N.E.2d 320, 320 (N.Y. 1975).

22. Atlantic Track and Turnout, 989 F.2d at 544.
23. Silkworth, supranote 18, at 238-39. See also John C. Weistart Requirements
and Output Contracts: Quantity Variations Under the U.C.C., 1973 DUKE L.J. 599,
615.

24. Silkworth, supranote 18, at 238-39. The non-quantity determining party in
open quantity contracts assumes some risk that the production levels of the other party
will change. Silkworth, supra note 18, at 238-39.
25. Weistart, supranote 23, at 615.
26. Weistart, supranote 23, at 615.
27. Silkworth, supranote 18, at 238-39. In fact, the cost reduction offered to the
output seller attracts sellers to enter into output contracts. Given a steady demand for
production, the output seller "need not incur costs which are usually necessary to
stimulate and respond to demand." Weistart, supra note 23, at 616.
28. Silkworth, supra note 18, at 238.
29. Silkworth, supra note 18, at 239:
30. Weistart, supranote 23, at 615.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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Finally, output contracts present an element of flexibility to sellers that
is not present in fixed quantity contracts. 1 When business reversals occur,
the seller may reduce production to minimize losses." In contrast, the seller
may increase production under an output contract to maximize profits. 3 To
achieve this level of flexibility, the buyer must accept the risk of quantity
variations under the contract, usually in exchange for a lower price. 4
Although flexibility is an important feature of output contracts, clearly
there must be a limit to the level of variation permitted. "[T]he nature of
permissible and impermissible quantity variation permissible in open quantity
contracts has been the subject of lawsuits for over 100 years."35 In
determining the permissible level of variation, requirement contracts are often
equated with output contracts. 6 In both types of contracts, "one party, either
the requirements buyer or the output seller, determines the quantity that will
be taken or delivered under the contract. '37 Furthermore, "[tihe output seller
in a rising market... is in much the same position as the requirement buyer
in a falling market. '38 In a falling market, the requirement buyer, obligated
to pay the contract price for goods, has an incentive to purchase fewer
goods.39 Similarly, in a rising market an output seller, who receives the
contract price for goods, operates at a higher cost; therefore, the output seller
has an incentive to decrease output."0
A. Pre-Code Decisions
Prior to the UCC, courts applying the common law refused to enforce
open quantity contracts due to concerns related to lack of mutuality and
indefiniteness.4 1 However, courts eventually began to enforce these contracts
as their commercial advantages became apparent. 2

31. Silkworth, supra note 18, at 239.
32. Weistart, supranote 23, at 613.
33. Weistart, supra note 23, at 613.

34. Weistart, supranote 23, at 613.
35. Silkworth, supra note 18, at 235.

36. Weistart, supra note 23, at 638.
37. Silkworth, supra note 18, 238.
38. Harold C. Havighurst & Sidney M. Berman, Requirement and Output
Contracts,27 ILL. L. REv. 1, 18 (1932).

39. Id. at 2.
40. Id.
41. Silkworth, supranote 18, at 246-47 (citing Baileyv. Austrian, 19 Minn. 535
(Gil 465, 468)(1873), overruled by House of Gurney, Inc. v. Ronan, 245 N.W. 30

(Minn. 1932).
42. Silkworth, supra note 18, at 246-47 (citing e.g., T.B. Walker Mfg. Co. v.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/9

4

Owings: Owings: Output Contracts and the Unreasonably Disproportionate

1994]

SOUTPUT CONTRACTS1

1055

As open quantity contracts became enforceable, various courts held that
the party determining the quantity in an open quantity contract could vary the
production level or demand.4" In considering the issue of quantity decreases
within an output contract, Professor Corbin asked if the "seller promise[s] by
implication that he will have any 'output,' that he will run his factory or work
his mine, with diligence, according to past custom, or at all?"44 Corbin
concluded that courts had generally allowed sellers in an output contract to
decrease their production levels.45
Additionally, courts held that increases and decreases in quantity resulting
from the behavior of the quantity determining party were permissible.4" For
example, in Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co.," the buyer

agreed to purchase the seller's entire output of cinder.4" The seller's main
business was sulphur refining, of which cinder was a by-product.49 Due to
the start of the First World War, the demand for sulphur increased. 0
Therefore, the seller increased production of sulphur, thus increasing its supply
of cinder substantially.5 The court held that the buyer had to accept the
increased quantity of cinder, while acknowledging that the defendant might

Swift & Co., 200 F. 529, 531 (5th Cir. 1912); National Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg.
Co., 110 Ill.
427, 433 (1884).
43. Weistart, supra note 23, at 619 (citing e.g. Marx v. American Malting Co.,
169 F. 582 (6th Cir. 1909); Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sonheimer & Co., 239 F. 976
(S.D.N.Y. 1917); E.G. Dailey Co. v. Clark Can Co., 87 N.W. 761 (Mich. 1901)). In
the two cited cases which follow Eustis Mining, Weistart notes that the "court
emphasized that the increased needs of the buyer/plaintiff were foreseeable by the
parties on the basis of facts known at the time the requirements contracts were entered
into." Id. at 640, n.100. This reasoning closely resembles the interrelated doctrines
of frustration of purpose and impossibility of performance discussed in this Note,
which modem courts have often failed to use in determining the level of permissible
variation within an open quantity contract.
44. 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN,
Weistart, supra note 23, at 619.

CoRrnN ON CONTRACTS

§ 569 (1963), quoted in

45. CORBIN, supranote 44, §569. For further support, see cases cited in CORBIN,
supra note 44, §569 n.93.
46. Silkworth, supra note 18, at 249-56 (citing e.g. Standard Magnesium Corp.
v. United States, 241 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1957); Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v.
Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 130 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1942); American & British Mfg.
Corp. v. New India Quicksilver Mining Co., 293 F. 509, 530 (1st Cir. 1923); and
Welded Tube Co. of America v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 377 F.Supp. 74 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
47. 239 F. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)
48. Id. at 986, cited in Weistart, supra note 23, at 639-40.
49. Eustis Mining, 239 F. at 986. See also Weistart, supra note 23 at 640.
50. Eustis Mining, 239 F. at 986. See also Weistart, supra note 23, at 640.
51. EustishMining, 239 F. at 986. See also Weistart, supra note 23, at 640.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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not have entered the agreement if the increase in production had been

certain words"
contemplated.52 The court stated that parties must "use more
53

if they wish to limit quantity variations in output contracts.
However, prior to the UCC, courts did not allow the seller in an output
contract unbridled discretion to decrease or increase the quantity tendered. In
Mantell v. InternationalPlastic Harmonica Corp.,54 a harmonica producer
entered into an agreement to sell its total output of harmonicas to the buyer
up to a stated maximum." When the producer realized the contract was not
favorable, it began delivering harmonicas to other purchasers without meeting
its obligation to the output purchaser." The court found that the producer
was obligated to supply the buyer up to the maximum output required by the
contract before selling harmonicas to other purchasers."
Commentators generally agree that prior to the UCC, courts searched for
good faith when reviewing open quantity contract cases involving quantity
variations." Courts found good faith when a valid business reason for the
variation existed, as opposed to evidence of contract manipulation. 9
Therefore, if courts found a seller to have a valid business reason and to have
no intent to manipulate the contract, the court would uphold the seller's
quantity variation in an output contract.6"
B. UCC interpretations
Opinions differ as to whether the UCC establishes a quantitative
limitation upon output and requirements variations.61 Section 2-306(1)
applies to both output and requirements contracts and reads:
52. Eustis Mining, 239 F. at 986. See also Weistart, supra note 23, at 640.
53. Eustis Mining, 239 F. at 986 cited in Weistart, supranote 23, at 610.
54. 49 A.2d 290 (N.J. Ch. 1946) modified, 55 A.2d 250 (N.J. 1947).
55. Id. at 293, cited in Silkworth, supra note 18, at 255. In reality, the seller
agreed to sell all of its output up to a stated maximum. Mantell, 49 A.2d at 293.
56. Mantell, 49 A.2d at 293-94.
57. Id.
58. See Silkworth, supra note 18, at 236-37; Weistart, supranote 23, at 621.
59. Silkworth, supranote 18, at 256. Valid "business reasons justifying increases
in quantity include modifications, technical advances, growth of business, and
expansions of factories." Silkworth, supra note 18, at 256. Lack of demand,
insolvency and the sale of one's business are justifications for decreases in quantity.
Silkworth, supranote 18, at 256.
60. Weistart, supranote 23, at 620-21 (citing e.g., HML Corp. v. General Foods
Corp., 365 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1966); Oregan Plywood Sales Corp. v. Sutherlin Plywood
Corp., 246 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1957); Keener Oil & Gas Co. v. Consolidated Gas Util.

Corp., 190 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. (1951)).
61. Weistart, supra note 23, at 600.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/9
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A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the
requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may
occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate
to any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any normal
or otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or
demanded.62

1. The Two-Step Analysis Approach
Some commentators have stated the explicit language of section 2-306(1)
requires a two-step test in analyzing any variation of quantity within an open
quantity contract.63 Under this interpretation, courts must determine whether
the quantity determining party is varying the quantity term in good faith.'
Second, courts must determine whether the quantity variation is reasonably
proportionate to a stated estimate or any prior output. 65 Under this analysis,

the Code imposes a limitation beyond good faith on both increases and

decreases in output levels.66 The language of the UCC, which states that
good faith variations are permitted except for disproportionate variations,
explicitly limits variations not in good faith.67
The comments to the UCC offer little help in determining whether the
drafters intended to engraft a quantitative limitation onto the common law
Comment 2 endorses the elasticity provided by open quantity
test.6"

62. U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (1990).
63. Silkworth, supra note 18, at 240; Weistart, supranote 23, at 603-04 and n.9.
Professor Weistart notes that the Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the
Oregon State Bar has accepted a quantitative limitation on certain requirements
reductions.
Whereas the requirements under all output or requirements constraints are
restricted by the limits of good faith, further limitation of reasonableness in
the extent of variation from anticipation of quantities is improved where
there is either a prior course of dealing between the parties on the basis of
which output or requirements could be estimated or an estimate of output
or requirements stated in the agreement.
Weistart, supra note 23, at 603-04 n.9 (quoting OREGON STATE BAR, UNIFORM
COMMERcLAL CODE HANDBOOK 30 (1963).

64.
65.
66.
67.

Silkworth, supra note 18, at 240.
Silkworth, supra note 18, at 240.
Weistart, supra note 23, at 603.
Weistart, supranote 23, at 603 (citing Professor Honnald in N.Y. REVISION

COMMISSION, STUDY OF TBE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

(1955)).

68. Silkworth, supranote 18, at 239-46. The common law test considered only
the good faith of the quantity determining party. Id. See supra notes 58-60 and
accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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contracts and permits good faith variations.69 Despite inherent ambiguities
within comment 2, the comment appears to endorse the pre-UCC good faith
requirements.70
However, comment 3 appears to be in direct conflict with the comment
2 endorsement of elasticity.71 Comment 3 states:
If an estimate of output or requirements is included in the agreement, no
quantity unreasonably disproportionate to it may be tendered or demanded.
Any minimum or maximum set by the agreement shows a clear limit on the
intended elasticity. In similar fashion, the agreed estimate is to be regarded
as a center around which the parties intend variation to occur.72
Comment 3 appears "to require that a circle of reasonableness be drawn
around an estimate or prior quantity that presumably would preclude extreme
variations."73
One must recognize that while comments to the UCC are to be given
some weight, the comments were not drafted at the request of the adopting
legislature, nor are they subject to its review.74 In addition, the comments
were often drafted a considerable time after the drafting of the related UCC
provision.75 Therefore, the language of the UCC is to be given greater
weight than the comments. 6
By applying the two-step test to quantity variations in open quantity
contracts, the flexible nature of such contracts would be limited. 7 This
effect may1 be undesirable, as it may limit the commercial advantages of such
contracts.7

69. Silkworth, supra note 18, at 241. Comment 2 reads in part:
Reasonable elasticity in the requirements is expressly envisaged by this
sectionand good faithvariations from prior requirements are permitted even
when the variation may be such as to result in discontinuance ....
Reasonable variation of an extreme sort is exemplified in SouthwestNatural
Gas v. Oklahoma PortlandCement.

U.C.C. § 2-306(1) cmt. 2 (1990).
70. Silkworth, supra note 18, at 241.
71. Silkworth, supra note 18, at 241.
72. U.C.C. § 2-306(1) cmt. 3 (1990).
73. Silkworth, supra note 18, at 242.
74. Weistart, supranote 23, at 606 n.17.
75. Weistart, supra note 23, at 606 n.17.
76. See Weistart, supranote 23, at 606 n.17.
77. Weistart, supranote 23, at 623.
78. Weistart, supranote 23, at 623.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/9
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2. The Separate Standards Interpretation
The more widely accepted interpretation of section 2-306 is the
unreasonably disproportionate standard applies only to increases in quantity,
and decreases in quantity are subject only to the good faith standard. 9 This
interpretation finds support in both the language of the comments and the
policy implications. Professor Weistart finds that comment 2 suggests
decreases in quantity are subject only to the good faith standard, in part
because the comment approves of the decision in Southwest Natural Gas Co.
v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co."0 In that case, the court allowed a
purchaser under a requirements contract to reduce its requirements
drastically."1
Professor Havighurst details the output seller's economic position in
situations involving a decrease.' In a scenario where the market price falls
below the contract price and the seller wants to deliver less, both parties to an
output contract lose.83 The output seller loses profits.' The output buyer
loses profits upon the loss of supply. 5 Thus, in allowing the quantity
decrease,the marketrisk is generally spread between two parties, lessening the
total economic impact.8 6
One commentator notes that disallowing disproportionate decreases in
quantity under an output contract interferes with business judgment.' The
parties entered into an open quantity contract, with flexibility in production
and business judgment as a major concern.' Furthermore, a party entering
into an open quantity contract has probably not given up the right to decrease
output.8 9 Therefore, the majority of commentators accept the good faith
standard for decreases in quantity.

79. Silkworth, supra note 18, at 242-43.
80. Weistart, supranote 23, at 633-34. Professor Weistart gives more credence
to comment 2 than comment 3 due to the history of the comments. Weistart, supra

note 23, at 635-36.
81. Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 102 F.2d 630
(10th Cir. 1939).
82. Havighurst, supranote38, at 15, citedin Silkworth, supranote 18, at 244-45.
83. Silkworth, supranote 18, at 244-45.
84. Silkworth, supranote 18, at 245.
85. Weistart, supra note 23, at 644.
86. Weistart, supra note 23, at 644.
87. Weistart, supra note 23, at 645-46.
88. Weistart, supra note 23, at 646.
89. Weistart, supra note 23, at 646. See also Note, Business Practicesand the
Flexibility of Long Term Contract,36 VA. L. REv. 627 (1950).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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However, in instances where the market price has fallen relative to the
contract price, the output seller may take advantage of the output buyer by
delivering more goods. Due to the increased incentive of an output seller to
take advantage of market forces in a quantity increase, some commentators
feel that quantity increases should have some limitation beyond good faith.9"
This limitation is justified as the seller will suffer no harm, presumably
because he can sell the excess quantity on the market.9 Therefore, the
limitation is both necessary and justified because
a legitimate purpose of the law of commercial transactions is to temper one
party's attempt to secure his greatest advantage with concem for the
potential impact upon the party from whom performance can be exacted.
If unbridled expectations are likely to produce considerable economic
hardship for one party, the stability of commercial transactions is promoted
by a limitation upon the effect of a potentially oppressive contractual
9
term.

Many courts have concluded that the UCC supports differing treatment
of quantity decreases and increases. In Angelica Uniform Group, Inc. v.
PonderosaSystems, Inc.,' the Eighth Circuit stated that section 2-306(1) of
the UCC "has been interpreted as allowing a buyer under a requirements
contract to order reductions which are highly disproportionate to a stated
estimate, if such reductions are done in good faith."94 Furthermore, in
Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co.,95 the court stated the
unreasonably disproportionate provision "does not apply, though the
requirement of good faith does, where the buyer 9takes
less rather than more
6
of the stated estimate in a requirements contract.
3. The Persistence of Pre-Code Standards
Although most commentators and courts agree the UCC changes the preUCC approach of analyzing permissible quantity variations, one
commentator's survey finds that courts have not substantively altered their
90. Weistart, supra note 23, at 646.
91. Weistart, supranote 23, at 646. Although this section discusses buyers in a
requirements contract, an output seller in a falling market is in virtually the same
position as a requirements buyer in a rising market. See supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
92. Weistart, supra note 23, at 642-46.
93. 636 F.2d 232 (8th Cir. 1980).
94. Id. at 232.
95. 840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988).
96. Id. at 1338.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/9
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analysis. "In the post-Code era.., some courts attempt to use the reasonable
proportionality test espoused in section 2-306. But this test does not seem to
alter their analysis from that used by pre-Code courts and may, in fact,
obscure it."97
For example, in Orange and Rockland Utilities Inc. v. Amerada Hess
Corp.,98 the court used the UCC language, but applied the common law
test.99 In Orange andRockland Utilities,Amerada Hess agreed to supply the
utility's fuel requirements at a fixed price for a period of about four
years."'0
Estimates of the utility's requirements were included in a
contractual clause.10 1 As the price of fuel oil began to increase rapidly, the
increased its requirements for the year of 1970 by about 63
utility company
10 2
percent.
Using UCC language, the court reasoned that unreasonably
disproportionate is not the equivalent of lack of good faith.0 3 The court
found that the term unreasonably disproportionate is "keyed to stated estimates
...which represents a departure from prior case law, wherein estimates were
generally treated as having been made simply for the convenience of the
parties and of no operative significance.' 14
The court found the utility's demand of more than double the stated
estimate was disproportionate, but refused to use that measure as an inflexible
standard of "unreasonably disproportionate."1 5 Instead, the court listed
factors leading it to conclude the quantity variation was disproportionate.
First, the court noted that the buyer's requirements had more than
doubled. 6 The seller had no way to forecast such an increase. 7 The
market price of fuel oil had more than doubled.0 Finally, the increase in
requirements was cause by the utility's increased sales to other utilities. 9
Effectively finding contract exploitation, the court disallowed the increase in
110
quantity.

97. Silkworth, supra note 18, at 264.
98. 397 N.Y.S.2d 814 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
99. Id. at 821-22; Silkworth, supranote 18, at 259-60.
100. Orange and Rockland Utilities, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 817.
103. Id. at 818.
104. Id. at 818-19.
105. Id. at 821-22.
106. Id. at 822.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 822.

110. Id. See also Silkworth, supra note 18, at 260.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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4. A Possible Alternative: Frustration of Purpose
The interrelated doctrines of impossibility of performance and frustration
of purpose protect both sellers and buyers where performance in a contract
became impossible or impracticable."' The Uniform Commercial Code
recognizes both doctrines in section 2-615."' However, the doctrine has
rarely been applied to open quantity contracts." 3
Although section 2-615 refers solely to sellers, comment 9 reflects the
view many courts have adopted, stating that in certain instances "the present
section may well apply and entitle the buyer to the exemption.""' 4 The term
is used to refer to sellers, while frustration is applied to
impracticability
5
11

buyers.

In order to be granted protected under section 2-615, three elements must
be proven. First, a party "must not have assumed the risk of some unknown
contingency. ' 1" Second, the "nonoccurrence of the contingency must have
Finally, the actual
been a basic assumption underlying the contract.""'

111. JAMES J. WHrm & ROBERT S. SUMMERs, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 3.9 at 165 (3d ed. 1988).
.112. Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and subject
to the preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who
complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a
contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by
the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption onwhich the contract was made or by compliance in good faith
with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order
whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
U.C.C. § 2-615 (1990).
113. For a rare case applying the impossibility doctrine to an open quantity
contract, see Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp., 310 N.E.2d 363
(Mass. 1974). In this case, the plaintiff contracted with the concrete company for the
supply of concrete to be used in a construction project. Id. at 364. The concrete
company failed to make delivery due to a labor dispute. Id. Upon the plaintiff's suit
for breach of contract, the defendant offered the defense of impossibility of
performance. Id. at 366. The appellate court found the doctrine of impossibility
applicable to the requirements contract involved in the case. Id. at 367-68.
114. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 9 (1990).
115. Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265,
277 (7th Cir. 1986).
116. W=nrE & SUMMERS, supranote 111, § 3.9, at 172 (quoting Iowa Elec. Light

and Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F.Supp. 129, 134 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'don other
grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 911 (1980)).
117. WMrrE & SUMMERS, supranote 111, § 3.9, at 172.
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occurrence of the contingency "must have made performance commercially
impracticable." 11'
However, courts have been reluctant to rely on mere variations in price
to excuse performance in a fixed-price contract. Judge Posner noted that
impossibility is a doctrine that shifts risk "in accordance with parties'
presumed intentions.. ,,119 Therefore, the doctrine has no place in a fixedprice contract, which is "an explicit assignment of the risk of market price
increases to the seller and the risk of market price decreases to the
buyer ..
,,12o Therefore, courts rarely apply the doctrines of impracticability
or frustration of purpose due to a price variation.
Although courts are reluctant to use the doctrines of impossibility and
frustration of purpose in a fixed price contract, in the application of this
doctrine a court must examine the parties' unstated expectations in order to
determine which nonoccurrences were basic assumptions of the contract and
which were not."' In order to do this, a court must often examine factors
revealed in the parties' negotiation process.'
A court must often "direct a just and reasonable result" when
contingencies occur about which the parties had no expectations.l" In these
cases, a court must determine the agreement reasonable people would have
reached if the contingency had been considered, given the terms on which the
parties did agree."2
Finally, it is clear that the drafters were at least thinking of quantity
variations in open quantity contracts when writing the comments to section
2-615. In comment 9, the drafters wrote:
Exemption of the buyer in the case of a "requirements" contract is covered

by the "Output and Requirements" section as to assumption and allocation
of the relevant risks. 1m
The doctrines of impossibility and frustration of purpose offer an
alternative form of analysis which courts may use to limit harsh consequences
of quantity variations, made in good faith, within an output contract. When
certain events occur within an open quantity contract about which the parties

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

§ 3.9, at 172.
NorthernInd. Pub. Serv. Co., 799 F.2d at 278.
Id.
WHrrE & SUMMERs, supra note 111, § 3.9, at 174.
WHiTE & SUMMERS, supra note 111, § 3.9, at 174.
123. WHTE & SUMMERS, supra note 111, § 3.9, at 174.
124. WHE & SUMMERS, supra note 111, § 3.9, at 174.
125. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 9 (1990).
WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 111,
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had no expectations, these doctrines offer courts a justification for excusing
performance.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Atlantic Track and Turnout, the court noted output contracts are
governed by UCC section 2-306.126 The court stated little had been written
regarding application of the UCC to quantity variations in output
contracts."z Relying on previous cases analyzing the applicability of section
2-306 to requirement contracts, the court found that most authorities treated
quantity increases differently than quantity decreases."' Thus, the court
applied this differing treatment to the output contract between Atlantic and
Perini.129 The court noted that if an output seller chose to increase profits
by increasing output provided to a buyer, good faith alone might not limit the
risk to the buyer. 3 ' Therefore, the unreasonably disproportionate clause

would be needed."3 '
However, the court refused to apply an additional limitation beyond good
faith to the quantity reduction which Perini, as the output seller, had forced

on Atlantic. 32 The court reasoned that forcing Perini and other output
sellers to meet contract estimates would lead to inefficient business
decisions.'33 Therefore, the court held that output contracts amount to a
risk allocation, with the seller maintaining good faith discretion to limit
output. 34 However, the seller is limited to quantity increases that are in
good faith and not unreasonably disproportionate. 35

V. COMMENT
The adoption of section 2-306 has led to confusion over the permissible
level of quantity variation within an open quantity contract. Indeed, legal
commentators have not established whether the drafters of the UCC intended
to change the common law limitations on quantity increases. However, the
language of section 2-306 demonstrates the drafters intended to create a two126. Atlantic Track & Turnout, 989 F.2d at 544.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 545.
130. Id. at 544.

131. Id.
132. Id. at 545.
133. Id. at 544.
134. Id. at 545.
135. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol59/iss4/9
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fold requirement for both quantity increases and decreases in open quantity
contracts.
By adopting a different test in quantity increase cases, courts have
assumed that the good faith standard fails to appropriately limit the seller from
overreaching. For example, in Atlantic Track and Turnout, the court stated:
"If a seller saw an opportunity to increase his profits by buying additional
to the buyer, this exploitation might not conclusively
goods to resell as output
136
establish bad faith.'
However, the court failed to recognize that the factors developed under
the good faith standard in pre-UCC decisions included both lack of contract
If a seller were
exploitation and the presence of a valid business reason.'
to increase output merely because the market price had declined relative to the
contract price, a court would not find good faith to be present. Therefore, the
good faith standard would disallow quantity increase in Atlantic Track and
Turnout.
In direct contrast to their lack of confidence in the good faith standard in
quantity increase cases, commentators who advocate differing tests for quantity
increases and decreases are comfortable in relying on the good faith limitation
in quantity decrease cases. One commentator, in acknowledging that quantity
decreases may result in inequitable distribution of contractual risks, states that
the "overriding requirement of good faith should serve as an adequate basis
for control."' 33
In justifying the requirement of only a good faith limitation on quantity
decreases within open quantity contracts, some commentators rely on the
disincentive a producer has in limiting production. As discussed above, some
commentators have reasoned that a seller decreasing production will be
decreasing profits, which the seller has a disincentive to do. 39 However, a
decrease in production does not necessarily lead to a decrease in profits. In
fact, decreasing production may lead to increased profits when the producer's

production140 level is not at a point where its marginal costs equal marginal

revenues.

In addition, the widely accepted interpretation of section 2-3 06 limits the
flexibility of the open quantity contract provision, which is an element of the
parties' bargain. Recognizing that the buyer in an output contract probably

136. Atlantic Track and Turnout, 989 F.2d at 545.
137. See supranote 59.
138. Weistart, supranote 23, at 644.
139. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
140. See Silkworth, supra note 18, at 268 n.248, who notes that lack of demand
for the quantity determining party's product provides a valid business reason for a
decrease in production.
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received some price reduction for allowing the seller to maintain flexibility,
it is unfair to limit the flexibility beyond good faith.
The UCC provides nothing more than default rules. 14' Nothing in the
UCC suggests that the parties cannot control the harshness of their
agreement. 142 Therefore, 6ourts interpreting the UCC should limit the
requirement for permissible quantity variations in an output contract to the
standard of good faith.'43
Even if the disproportionate limitation of section 2-306 is eliminated,
courts will have access to the doctrines of frustration of purpose and
impossibility to limit harsh results that the parties did not contemplate when
contracting. For example, in Eustis Mining, the occurrence of World War I
led to great increases in the output seller's production of cinder. Referring to
section 2-615, a court could very easily find that the occurrence of the First
World War was a contingency, the nonoccurrence of which was a basic
assumption of the contract. If neither party assumed the risk of the occurrence
and the occurrence made performance commercially impracticable, a court
could excuse the buyer from purchasing the increased output of sulphur by
invoking the frustration of purpose doctrine.
In Atlantic Track and Turnout, the court did not need to adopt the
differing treatment of quantity increases and decreases to effectively limit
overreaching in future increase cases. First, the court could have determined
whether the quantity variation was made in good faith. Having discovered
that Perini did not deliver the stated estimates of material due cancellation of
the contract with MBTA, the trial court in fact determined that Perini did not
act in bad faith.'44
To effectively limit overreaching the court could have utilized the
impossibility of performance doctrine. The court could have easily found that
MBTA's funding shortage, and the resulting cancellation of MBTA's contract
with Perini, was a contingency, the non-occurrence of which was a basis of
the contract. Obviously, both parties contracted with the assumption that
MBTA would fund Perini's undercutting. Therefore, Perini would be excused
from performance.

141. Weistart, supra note 23, at 619.
142. Weistart, supranote 23, at 619. See also U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1990).
143. See Sillworth, supra note 18, at 272-75, who argues that courts largely
follow the pre-UCC test for good faith in determining the level of quantity variation
permitted. Because the pre-UCC good faith standard did not permit contract
exploitation in quantity variation, the Code and courts should limit the standard in
§ 2-306 to good faith.

144. Atlantic Track & Turnout, 989 F.2d at 545-46.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The First Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a differing treatment for
quantity increases and decreases within open quantity contracts. However,
such a rule is unnecessary to limit overreaching in quantity increase cases.
The good faith limitation and frustration of purpose doctrine effectively
protects parties to an open quantity contract.
RANDAL OWINGS
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